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Lawyers and social justice
by Michael E. Tigar
Crusaders in the Courts, by Jack
Greenberg. Basic Books, 10 E. 53rd
St., New York, N.Y. 10022. 212-207-
7057. 1994. xxii, 643 pages. $30.
n the late 1940s a law student
named Jack Greenberg read that a
half-unit of credit was available to stu-
dents who would work on civil rights
cases. Although the hours were long
for such a meager reward, Greenberg,
a war veteran recently returned from
the Pacific, signed up.
This experience may not have been
transformative for this immigrant's
son who had grown up in the socialist-
Zionist milieu of the Bronx, where
concerns for social justice were close at
hand. But it did propel Greenberg
into contact with Thurgood Marshall
and the other great leaders of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Shortly
after Greenberg graduated from law
school he become an LDF staff lawyer.
Crusaders in the Courts, an important
and richly detailed book, is an account
of the next 40 years in litigation to de-
fend and extend civil rights.
It is the sort of book to give one's
children, who, as they confront the
path ahead, may not know how long
and arduous the journey has been.
The book also tells law students some-
thing about the role lawyers can play in
social change, and even about the lim-
its of that role. Lawyers are, after all, in
charge of remembering. Sometimes
their rememberings are trivial, as with
the citation of a rule to govern proce-
dure. Sometimes, the remembering is
malign, as in quoting a harsh prece-
dent so that the same thing may be
done again. But in the most fulfilling
and helpful sense, lawyers are to re-
member injustice in order to help pre-
vent it in the future.
Casting our minds back, we will re-
call there was no federal civil rights
legislation of consequence until the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. We may also
recall the ways in which the walls of
segregation were breached, first tenta-
tively and then more insistently. The
African-American political ferment of
the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s led to
demands for change. Charles Hamil-
ton Houston, Thurgood Marshall's
mentor, played an early and decisive
role in shaping the Legal Defense
Fund's strategy. Houston was a princi-
pal architect of Steele v. Louisville & Na-
tional Railway Co., in which the Su-
preme Court held that a compulsory
bargaining agent for railway workers
had a "duty of fair representation."
That is, the union could not foster dis-
crimination in the workplace, nor in
terms of employment. It had the duty
to represent all the covered employees
equally.
A new strategy
Steele, decided in 1944, vindicated a liti-
gation strategy based on representing
group interests. One must pause to ask
what made this sort of approach pos-
sible? The "civil procedure" answer is
that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which became effective in 1937,
broadened the availability of class ac-
tions. But there could not be suits with-
out clients and theories.
The clients were among the newly
militant African-Americans in the
workplace and the community, and
those contemplating advancement
through education. The theory was
more controversial. In African-Ameri-
can groups and among the white
American left, there had been the old
debate whether an integrationist strat-
egy was preferable to some form of
separatism.
The Legal Defense Fund took the
position that integration was the best
road to follow, for the African-Ameri-
can community and as a strategy for
litigation. As Thurgood Marshall said
to the Supreme Court in 1950, "We
want to remove governmental restric-
tion-if they want to, they can keep
their prejudices." It is easier to act
yourself into right thinking than to
think yourself into right acting. If race
hatred was to be exposed and eroded,
ending forced segregation was the way
to do it.
Greenberg chronicles the path to
Brown v. Board of Education and be-
yond. The first task was to confront the
old "separate but equal" teaching of
Plessy v. Ferguson. One example of this
early litigation related by Greenberg is
particularly telling for me, as I teach at
a law school desegregated by the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Sweatt v.
Painter. Heamon Sweatt applied for ad-
mission to the University of Texas
School of Law, but was refused because
he was not white. His Texas lawyer, W.J.
Durham, asked Thurgood Marshall
and James NabritJr. to help litigate the
case.
Texas responded by setting up a
"law school for Negroes," which it
claimed was equal to the one for
whites. The new school was in rented
basement quarters and had neither li-
brary, nor law review, nor permanent
faculty. Its teachers were part-time vol-
unteers from UT Law School, and
Charles McCormick, who also served
as dean of The University of Texas
School of Law, was its dean.
The NAACP had said that requiring
literal compliance with "separate but
equal" would eventually bring an end
to segregation, which would prove to
be too expensive. But nobody in May
1947 could know just how or when this
transition would take place.
The State of Texas put on witnesses,
including Charles McCormick, who
swore that the two schools were equal.
Sweatt's lawyers pointed out that the
law schools could not possibly provide
equality in all the things that matter in
legal education, including the collegi-
ality of studying and working with oth-
ers. In 1950, the Supreme Court
agreed, and the tone of its opinion
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foreshadowed the holding in Brown
that separate schools are inherently
unequal.
The LDF lawyers-Marshall, Green-
berg, Nabrit, and others-succeeded
grandly at the law's most difficult
game. They took an existing para-
digm-"separate but equal," which
had been devised to restrain claims for
justice-and recast it as a promise that
they demanded be fulfilled. Since the
paradigm had been devised by judges
and met the standards for judicial en-
forcement by injunction, they brought
their claims to federal court.
Reliance on the courts
The LDF lawyers therefore gave courts
dominated by judges appointed by
Roosevelt and Truman the opportu-
nity to agree that the promise must be
enforced. By insisting on enforce-
ment, they showed that the paradigm
was itself fatally flawed-that both of
its promises could not be kept. That is,
that separate could not be equal.
Until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, al-
most the entire burden of extending
human rights through the legal pro-
cess in the postwar period fell upon
the federal courts, with occasional
help from the executive branch.
Greenberg's book helps us remember
and celebrate the role of Article III
judges, fulfilling their oaths and their
constitutional duty to defend counter-
majoritarian principles rooted in the
Constitution. There is an unfortunate
tendency these days to minimize, and
even to deride, the resort to courts as
protectors of rights. As an example, on
January 25, 1993, the day after Thur-
good Marshall died, Justice Clarence
Thomas filed a concurring opinion in
Graham v. Collins. The opinion con-
tained an all-out attack on the LDF's
capital punishment litigation strategy,
calling it the work of "a small number
of ambitious lawyers and academics on
the Fund's behalf."
Greenberg's book is a decisive an-
swer to Justice Thomas's contentions,
if one sees LDF history not as lawyers'
victories but as responses to the de-
mands of African-Americans for hu-
man rights. LDF's arraignment of the
criminal justice system and its inherent
racial bias is emphatically not the
product of professorial imagination
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but of grim reality. Its decision to
launch a litigation strategy is in the
best tradition of its earlier victories.
Only the Supreme Court's decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp, barring consider-
ation of systemic racial bias in adminis-
tration of the death penalty, has kept
the issue from being more fully ex-
plored in the Court's opinions.
The LDF lawyers were an essential
part of the struggle for change as it
shifted focus from education to public
accommodation, to housing, jobs, and
the criminal justice system. They were
counsel in some of the most significant
constitutional decisions in the nation's
history. Greenberg draws on the trove
of LDF records to tell that story.
A lack of charity
To have been an LDF leader during
this difficult period required tenacity
and singleness of purpose at the time
the battles were being waged. There
are, however, moments in Greenberg's
book when one wishes that the dis-
tance of years and the savor of victory
had led him to be more charitable to
his allies and opponents.
For example, I was taken aback by
Greenberg's characterization of Dean
McCormick's Sweatt v. Painter testi-
mony: "If the thought of testifying
honestly had crossed his mind he
would have had to consider that the
state legislature would retaliate with
devastating disapproval." This comes
close to accusing McCormick of per-
juring himself, saved only by the appar-
ent qualification that perhaps McCor-
mick didn't have a thought about
testifying differently. I asked our librar-
ians to unearth the Sweatt transcript-
the actual typewriter carbon copy on
onionskin-and spent a joyous couple
of hours reading over the words of fa-
miliar figures.
Fair-minded people can differ, but I
don't find McCormick's testimony dis-
honest or false. Make no mistake,
McCormick should have spoken up for
integration of the law school. His fears
about the political and social conse-
quences of accepting integration were
misplaced, and he had a duty to assert
leadership. But reading McCormick's
testimony as a trial lawyer, I can see
how carefully he wove his version of
events and focused on the literal
truth-such things as square feet of
space per student and the debatable
value of law reviews.
More troubling is Greenberg's un-
willingness to rethink old disputes with
his allies in the civil rights movement,
and his repetition of some unflattering
and surely undeserved castigation of
those with whom he disagreed. For ex-
ample, the 1963-64 period in Danville,
Virginia, saw a tactical dispute between
more conservative and more militant
African-American leaders. At the cen-
ter of this controversy was a lawyer
named Len Holt who did a lot of good
work and had the confidence of many
people in the movement for change.
Greenberg dismisses the controversy
with Holt by saying, "[W] e thought he
wasn't a very good lawyer or reliable."
This is too curt, too dismissive, and
does less than full justice to the histori-
cal record.
There is a disturbingly similar lack
of charity toward the National Law-
yers' Guild and its members, and the
young LDF lawyers in Greenberg's
own office who urged him to be more
receptive to the defense of embattled
radical leaders such as Angela Davis.
Greenberg does not even mention the
significant contributions of many in-
fluential lawyers and groups, such as
Arthur Kinoy and the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights, nor some leading
cases won by non-LDF attorneys, such
as Dombrowski v. Pfister.
This is not to say that Greenberg
should alter his views of these events,
only that one of the lessons we need to
learn about change is how to behave
toward our allies-and even our oppo-
nents of good will.
I have a broader concern about tak-
ing history so personally, illustrated by
Greenberg's statement about May
1963: "I won a group of sit-in cases in
the Supreme Court." Who won? Law-
yers are privileged to stand at the cen-
ter of social change only because some
clients risked something for their prin-
ciples and then came to them for help.
It is easy to slip into saying that "I the
lawyer" won, just like an obstetrician
may say "I delivered the baby." But
such figures of speech mask someone
else's real struggle to bring something
about.
The sit-in cases came to be because
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young black men and women took
risks to speed the pace of change.
Greenberg was among the courageous
lawyers who came to their defense de-
spite the misgivings of more conserva-
tive leaders. The eventual Supreme
Court victory was a vindication for the
lawyers who helped, but mainly for the
young people whose action and tactics
propelled nonviolent resistance to the
Unintended consequences
by Albert P. Melone
Critical Judicial Nominations and
Political Change: The Impact of
Clarence Thomas, by Christopher E.
Smith. Praeger Publishers, 88 Post
Road West, Westport, Ct. 06881.
800-225-5800. 1993. 192 pages.
$47.95.
N ominations to the U.S. Supreme
Court in recent years have at-
tracted the interest of the media and a
large segment of the public. Personal
ambitions and the clash of political
forces combine to create compelling
drama. Christopher Smith's book,
CriticalJudicial Nominations and Political
Change: The Impact of Clarence Thomas,
contributes to our understanding of
these events by focusing on the unin-
tended consequences of nominations
to the Supreme Court.
Readers intrigued by the Clarence
Thomas nomination will find the
author's treatment a useful reminder
of events. Professor Smith shows that
the charges of sexual harassment, and
the events surrounding them, trans-
formed the confirmation controversy
from the nominee's professional quali-
fications and the future direction of
the Supreme Court into a catalytic po-
litical event. The Senate hearings
served to mobilize women as candi-
dates and as voters, having a profound
impact on the 1992 congressional elec-
tions and to a lesser extent the presi-
dential election.
The author's chief purpose is to pro-
pose a new conceptualization of judi-
cial nominations. It is this part of the
centerpiece of the civil rights move-
ment. This decisive shift meant that
the movement would no longer be
content only with such victories as the
courts might eventually give, but
would engage in a broader political of-
fensive for its goals.
Many of us can close our eyes and re-
member a segregated social landscape.
We open our eyes and see today's hu-
Associate Justice Clarence Thomas
book that needs work; indeed, Smith
admits as much. Yet this aspect of the
book reveals a mind at work, a struggle
to make sense of events. As important
as this intellectual process is to cre-
ation of new understandings, the
reader is left with the impression that
the author has the beginning of an
idea, not a concept that possesses, as of
yet, intellectual maturity.
Four characteristics
The author defines critical judicial
nominations as those serving "...as
catalytic events for important changes
in politics and public policy that were
not anticipated by the political actors
who initiated the nominations"
(p. 11). The concept has four charac-
teristics. First, a critical nomination
may involve unsuccessful as well as suc-
man rights tasks. When we think of
how far we have come, the tales well
told in this book inform us and help us
teach those who have forgotten or who
never knew. When we assess what we
must do, this book helps us chart our
course. V1
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cessful nominations. Second, critical
nominations must trigger important
political events, not minor ones. Third,
critical nominations result in conse-
quences that go beyond changes in le-
gal doctrine. Fourth, the nominations
must result in consequences unantici-
pated by the political actors respon-
sible for making the appointment.
The last three of Smith's four neces-
sary conditions for a critical nomi-
nation suffer from excessive vague-
ness. He does not inform us how to
identify an "important political event"
except in slightly less vague ways. But
Smith does offer a few examples from
history to illustrate his idea. Most no-
table are the nominations of John
Marshall and Abe Fortas. However,
both instances also illustrate the diffi-
culty with the concept.
The author claims that President
John Adams could not have antici-
pated the impactJohn Marshall would
ultimately have on the role of the Su-
preme Court in American society. Yet
Adams appointed his trusted secretary
of state because of his Federalist views.
Adams had every reason to believe that
Marshall would support Federalist
policies. Marshall did not disappoint
Adams, nor anyone else who might
have believed in a strong central gov-
ernment. Consistent with conven-
tional wisdom, the author mistakenly
asserts that Marshall's employment of
judicial review is his true claim to fame
because by so doing the chief justice
made the Supreme Court a main
player in the nation's political life.
Smith is correct that this is something
Adams could not have anticipated.
However, today's use of the judicial
review doctrine is not what Marshall
decided in Marbury v. Madison. Strictly
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